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THE DRAFT CONSTITUTIONAL TREATY’S 
VOTING REFORM DILEMMA 
CEPS POLICY BRIEF NO. 44/NOVEMBER 2003 
RICHARD BALDWIN AND MIKA WIDGREN
* 
 
he ongoing Intergovernmental Conference (IGC 2003) must re-shape Giscard 
d’Estaing’s draft into a Constitutional Treaty that can be signed and subsequently 
ratified by all 25 members of the enlarged European Union.  
Things are not going well.  
The most obvious sticking point concerns the reform of voting rules in the EU’s key decision-
making body, the Council of Ministers. Here is the problem. 
As it turns out, the voting scheme that Giscard d’Estaing’s Praesidium put into the draft 
Constitutional Treaty is not politically acceptable to all EU members (it concentrates power in 
the hands of the four largest EU members at the expense of Spain, Poland and many small 
members). Indeed, Giscard’s system is so impolitic that any draft Constitutional Treaty that 
contains it will almost certainly fail to garner the necessary unanimous support. Yet, if the on-
going IGC does not find an alternative to Giscard’s system, the EU will face decision-making 
paralysis because the fallback position is the blotched voting system from the Nice Treaty.  
Hence the dilemma: papering over problems with Giscard’s unpopular voting rules puts the 
whole draft Constitutional Treaty at risk, but failing to agree an alternative voting scheme 
risks decision-making paralysis.  
In this policy brief, we summarise the findings of our research that uses the quantitative tools 
of voting game theory to show: 
•  Why Giscard’s scheme is politically unacceptable to many nations; and  
•  How various modified voting rules may solve the dilemma.  
Specifically we identify two possible solutions to the dilemma. First, changing Giscard’s 
double-majority thresholds from 60% of population and 50% of membership to 60% and 60% 
respectively would go a very long way to reducing the concentration of power in the hands of 
the four largest nations (‘Big-four’), yet still maintain the EU’s ability to act; a ratio of 50%-
50% would also work. Second, if the IGC decides to stay with the Nice Treaty’s triple-
majority voting system, modestly lowering two of the three majority thresholds would 
maintain efficiency without further shifting power to big nations.
1 
                                                 
* Richard Baldwin is at the Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva, Switzerland, and CEPR 
(baldwin@hei.unige.ch); Mika Widgren is at the Turku School of Economcis, Finland, and CEPR 
(mika.widgren@tukkk.fi) 
1 The full analysis can be retrieved from http://heiwww.unige.ch/~baldwin/. 
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Before turning to possible solutions, the first task is to show that the Nice voting reforms will 
not work, and, in the process, to show why Spain and Poland are so attached to the Nice 
system. 
Nice reforms will not work 
The Treaty of Nice radically reformed the Council of Ministers’ voting rules.
2 These changes 
will come into effect in November 2004 unless the current IGC agrees otherwise. The Nice 
Treaty’s main goal was to implement reforms that would allow an enlarged EU to operate 
efficiently and legitimately. It failed on this score. In fact, when it comes to Council voting, 
the Nice reforms made things worse. But how can one demonstrate such a thing? 
Capacity to act 
‘Capacity to act’ and ‘decision-making efficiency’ are slippery concepts. There is, however, a 
quantitative tool in voting game theory that helps make things more precise. The so-called 
‘passage probability’ gauges how likely it is that the Council would approve a randomly 
selected issue – random in the sense that each EU member would be equally likely to vote for 
or against it. The best way to describe this measure is to explain how it is calculated.  
First, the computer calculates all possible coalitions among EU members, namely every 
possible combination of yes- and no-votes by EU members (there are 134 million possible 
coalitions in the EU27). Then the computer checks each coalition to see if it is a winning 
coalition under the Nice voting system; this is done using each member’s actual weight on the 
three criteria (votes, members, population) and the three thresholds. The passage probability 
tells us what fraction of these coalitions are winning coalitions. It is called the passage 
probability because it is the likelihood that a random proposal would attract a winning 
coalition, assuming all coalitions are equally likely (random in the sense that member states 
do not know what their stance would be). Admittedly, this is a crude measure, but it is 
objective, precise and its strengths and shortcomings are clear.  
Even if the exact passage probability is meaningless (the Commission does not put forth 
random proposals), Figure 1 shows that the Nice Treaty fails on efficiency grounds since it 
implies a level of efficiency that is far, far below that of the EU15. Indeed, the Nice reforms 
actually made matters worse. Admitting 12 new members without any reform would have cut 
the passage probability to a third of its already low level, namely to 2.5%. With the Nice 
reforms, the figure drops even further to 2.1%. We note that the main source of the lower 
efficiency is the high threshold of the Nice rules for Council votes. A second, cruder but more 
transparent efficiency-measuring tool – i.e. blocking-minority analysis – confirms these 
efficiency findings.
3 
                                                 
2 Legally, the Accession Treaty implements the voting system agreed politically in the Nice Treaty. 
3 See Baldwin, R., E. Berglof, F. Giavazzi and M. Widgren (2001), Nice Try: Should the Treaty of Nice be 
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Notes: The figures show the ‘passage probability’, which measures the likelihood that a randomly 
selected issue would pass in the Council of Ministers. Historical voting weights and thresholds are used 
for the EU15 and earlier EUs. The enlargement evaluated is the EU27 (EU15 plus the ten newcomers 
plus Bulgaria and Romania) using the Treaty of Nice ‘protocol on enlargement’ voting weights and 
thresholds. Source: Baldwin, Berglof, Giavazzi and Widgren (2001). 
Figure 1. Efficiency of the reforms agreed at Nice in perspective 
Interestingly, the Nice rules do maintain efficiency in the EU15; maybe this is what the EU15 
leaders had in mind when they agreed the Nice reforms. 
Winners and losers from the Nice reforms: why Spain and Poland are fighting 
so hard 
The Treaty of Nice massively shifted power from small EU members to big ones. This point 
can be illustrated with another quantitative tool in voting theory called the Normalised 
Banzhaf Index (NBI). In plain English, the NBI gauges how likely it is that a nation finds 
itself in a position to ‘break’ a winning coalition on a randomly selected issue. Thus, the NBI 
tells us how powerful a country is likely to be on a randomly chosen issue. Of course, on 
particular issues, various countries may be much more or much less powerful – especially if 
they are part of a like-minded group.
4 
Figure 2 shows how the Nice reforms changed the power distribution in the EU27. That is, the 
figure plots the difference between the NBIs under the Nice reforms and what they would 
have been if the current EU15 system had been extended to the newcomers.  
The diagram shows two critical points: 
1.  The Nice reforms greatly increased the power of large nations at the expense of small 
nations. 
2.  While Germany, France, the UK and Italy gained a lot, Spain and Poland gained twice 
as much.  
                                                 
4 See Baldwin, R., E. Berglof, F. Giavazzi and M. Widgren (2001), op. cit., for details and simple numerical 
examples. 4 | BALDWIN & WIDGREN 
 
Indeed, with the Nice reforms, Spain and Poland are set to become almost as powerful as 
Germany, even though they have only half of Germany’s population. To be specific, their 
NBIs are 7.4% while that of Germany is 7.8%; the Netherlands’s is 4%.
5 
Figure 2. Winners and losers from the Nice Reforms, EU27 
Given the extraordinary gains won by Spain and Poland in the Nice reforms, one understands 
why they are fighting so hard to preserve the Nice voting system. Having shown that the 
IGC’s fallback option is unworkable, yet very attractive to certain nations, we turn to see if 
there are other schemes that would maintain the EU’s ability to act without unnecessarily 
shifting power.  
Evaluation of various double-majority rules 
Giscard’s draft Constitutional Treaty proposes that a winning coalition in the Council must 
account for at least 60% of the EU population and at least 50% of the membership. Other 
options, however, are worth considering.  
•  During the IGC 2000, the Commission’s proposal – called double-simple majority (DSM) 
– defined a winning coalition as representing at least 50% of members who represented at 
least 50% of the EU population.  
•  Variants on this involve different majority thresholds, such as 50% of nations and 60% of 
population, 60% of both, or 70% of both. Thresholds of 50% of members and 62% or 
66.6% of population have also been mooted.  
                                                 
5 See our background study for further details (retrievable from http://heiwww.unige.ch/~baldwin/).  
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How to think about dual-majority schemes 
Before turning to the analysis, we note that the best way to think about dual-majority systems 
is to view them as giving two distinct weights to the vote of each nation; the relative 
stringency of the majority thresholds then determines the relative importance of the two 
weighting schemes. To see this, note that the population criterion weighs nations’ votes by 
their share of EU population. The member criterion weighs them by share of the membership, 
namely one twenty-fifth in the EU25, one twenty-seventh in the EU27, etc. In the extreme 
case, of a 99% threshold on population and a 1% threshold on membership, the membership 
weighting would be irrelevant since any coalition that had 99% of the population would also 
have more than 1% of the membership. Under the reverse extreme, 1%-99%, the population 
weighting would be irrelevant. Roughly speaking, the relative importance of the population 
weighting increases as the population threshold becomes more stringent.  
Passage probability for ten duals: the EU’s capacity to act 
The impact of the various dual-majority schemes on the EU’s decision-making capacity, as 
measured by the passage probability is shown in Figure 3. This includes Giscard’s proposal 
(60-50), and, for comparison, the passage probability of the complex Nice rules and the 
EU15’s current passage probability. 
There are three points to retain from this figure: 
1.  Almost all the dual-majority schemes maintain the EU’s ability to act since they imply 
passage probabilities in line with that of the EU15. Because the majority thresholds 
are lower than those in the Nice system, the dual-majorities tend to be more efficient. 
This suggests that many of the Nice system’s defects could be fixed by lowering the 
Nice-reform majority thresholds (more on this below). 
2.  Raising majority thresholds has a dramatic and highly nonlinear effect on efficiency. 
Moving from 50-50 to 60-60 lowers the passage probably about 27 percentage points; 
from 60-60 to 70-70 it reduces by 7 percentage points. (This feature of voting systems 
is well-known to voting theorists.) 
Figure 3. Passage probabilities, 11 different dual-majority schemes 
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3.  Raising the population threshold has less of a negative impact on efficiency than 
raising the member threshold. For example, the 50-60 scheme is less efficient than the 
60-50 scheme.  
The logic behind the asymmetric effects on efficiency is simple. Given the 
enormously skewed distribution of populations among EU25 member states, the 
population weighting of votes puts 75% of the votes in the hands of just six nations 
(the Big-six nations have 75% of the EU25 population). This sort of power 
concentration makes decision-making easier, so raising the majority threshold on 
population has less of an effect on the EU’s ability to act than raising the member 
threshold.  
Further enlargements 
The draft Constitutional Treaty should adopt rules that will allow the EU to function smoothly 
for many years, even after future enlargements. On this issue, one critical point does not come 
out in Figure 3 – the impact of membership enlargement on efficiency. Here it turns out that 
the 50-50 rule has very special properties.  
Whenever majority thresholds are above 50%, efficiency falls rapidly as the number of 
members rises. This result is well-known to voting theorists and its effect can be dramatic. 
For example, the passage probability for the EU25 with 60-60 is 13.1% while it is only 8.5% 
in the EU27.  
This effect is a straightforward implication of ‘combinatorics’. If the threshold is 50%, then 
an increase in membership increases the number of winning coalitions and the number of 
losing coalitions in exactly the same proportion (leaving aside a minor problem with even and 
odd numbers). After all, any coalition of yes-voters that wins has a corresponding coalition of 
no-voters that blocks. By contrast, enlargement with a higher threshold, say 60%, increases 
the number of blocking coalitions more than it increases the number of winning coalitions, so 
the passage probability drops. The basic point is that there are more ways to put together a 
41% blocking minority than there are to put together a 60% winning majority, and this 
difference grows with the number of members.  
This ‘membership invariance’ property of the 50% majority rule is exactly why it is used in 
virtually every large voting body, e.g. national parliaments. Any threshold higher than 50% 
produces very low passage probabilities when there are more than a few dozen voters. 
This consequence suggests that the 50-50, or double-simple majority in plain English, may be 
the best option for the EU as it looks towards the future. The 50-50 rule, however, was 
explicitly considered and rejected by EU15 members in the IGC 1996 and the IGC 2000. One 
reason may be that it is just too efficient for the members’ tastes. As we argued in our August 
2003 essay, improved efficiency shifts a great deal of power from the Council to the 
Commission and, to a lesser extent, to the Parliament.
6 The basic point is simple. When there 
are many possible winning coalitions, the agenda-setting Commission has much leeway in 
determining the exact details of the proposals that are passed.
7 Below we also explore one 
political difficulty that may explain this resistance to the 50-50 scheme. 
                                                 
6 Baldwin and Widgren (2003), Decision-making and the Constitutional Treaty: Will the IGC discard Giscard?, 
CEPS Policy Brief No. 37, CEPS, Brussels, August (retrievable from www.ceps.be).  
7 See Napel and Widgren (2003), EU Conciliation Committee: Council 56 versus Parliament 6, CEPR 
Discussion Paper 4071, for details of the argument. THE DRAFT CONSTITUTIONAL TREATY’S VOTING REFORM DILEMMA | 7 
 
Efficiency is an important criterion in choosing a voting system but ultimately the impact of 
reform on the distribution of power will be the key to its political acceptability. This point 
brings us to evaluate Giscard’s 60-50 plan – and a number of alternatives – from the 
perspective of power.  
Muscles in Brussels: the power implications 
Much of the politics of the on-going IGC can be understood by looking at how Giscard’s 
system changes the allocation of power in the enlarged EU. But what should be the basis of 
comparison? The Nice Treaty is the fallback option so one natural baseline is the power 
distribution implied by the Nice reforms. On the other hand, there is a widespread feeling that 
the Nice reforms were not ‘fair’, especially for small members. And, in any case, the world 
has no feeling for how the Nice reforms would operate in practice. This argument suggests 
that the natural baseline is the status quo. Because both natural baselines have their faults, we 
show the power changes with respect to both. 
Giscard vs. Nice: how much more power shifted to large nations? 
Three results in Figure 4 are striking. 
1.  The reform that Giscard proposed is yet another large shift of power towards large 
members. Indeed, the power shift implied in Giscard’s voting scheme is more than 
twice the size of the Nice Treaty’s power shift. The sum of the individual power 
changes for the Big-six shows a 13 percentage point gain under Giscard’s plan versus 
the current EU15 system. For the Nice plan, the equivalent was only 6.6 percentage 
points. 
Figure 4. Giscard and Nice vs. the status quo 
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2.  The extra power shift to large nations is very much biased towards Germany and to a 
lesser extent, France, Britain and Italy; Spain and Poland lose.  
In short, Giscard’s plan would break the near-equality among the Big-six, a result that 
may be especially difficult for Spain and Poland to swallow.  
3.  Compared with the power loss they faced under the Nice Treaty (again taking the 
current voting rules as the baseline), the medium-sized nations – those with around ten 
million citizens – will lose much more under the draft Constitutional Treaty, while the 
opposite is true for the tiny nations, i.e. those with less than 2.5 million citizens.  
Power implications of alternative dual thresholds  
Given the political unacceptability of Giscard’s plan, we evaluate the power shifts implied by 
variants on the dual-majority, again looking at the changes with respect to the Nice Treaty and 
with respect to an extension of the current system (since this is widely viewed as fair). The 
results are illustrated in Figure 5 and Figure 6.  
Three findings are especially noteworthy: 
1.  The ‘uneven’ thresholds, 60-50 and 50-60, produce more dramatic shifts in power 
when compared with either the fallback position of the Nice reforms or the status quo.  
As discussed above, the relative importance of the population-weights and 
membership-weights are extremely different for very large and very small nations, so 
uneven thresholds tend to redistribute power. 
2.  More precisely, while Giscard’s plan for 60-50 thresholds (population-membership) 
shifts power towards large nations, reversing the threshold to 50-60 would shift power 
from large nations to small nations. This effect is especially true when taking the Nice 
Treaty as the baseline, but it also holds when the status quo is the baseline.  
3.  Taking an extension of the status quo system as our metric of ‘fair’, the 50-50 and 60-
60 dual scheme produces the least deviation from ‘fair’.  
Specifically, the standard deviations for the power changes (vis-à-vis the status quo) 
of the various duals are 1.5% for Giscard’s 60-50, 0.7% for the double-simple 
majority of 50-50, 1.4% for 50-60 and 0.9% for 60-60.  
Duals of 50-50 or 60-60 take the cake 
The performance of the 60-60 dual-majority system is worth highlighting. 
Although almost all observers agreed that simply extending the current voting rules would 
produce decision-making paralysis, few suggest that such an extension would produce an 
unfair distribution of power. Thus it is particularly noteworthy that the 60-60 dual scheme 
implies a power distribution that is close to that of the status quo system extended to the 
EU27, but it is much, much more efficient; its passage probability is four times higher than 
that of the Nice scheme and it is slightly higher than the passage probability of the current 
voting rules in the EU15. THE DRAFT CONSTITUTIONAL TREATY’S VOTING REFORM DILEMMA | 9 
 
Figure 5. Power changes: various dual majority schemes vs. Nice 
We note that the ‘least change’ system is the 50-50 dual-majority. And it has a passage 
probability that is even higher than Giscard’s 60-50 scheme. A quick look at the figures may 
reveal why the EU15 rejected this natural, sensible and widely used system in IGC 1996 and 
IGC 2000. Under 50-50, most members experience only a very small change in their power 
compared with the status quo, but Germany gains a lot. Even more problematic from the 
political point of view may be the fact that Germany gains substantially while the other Big-
four see no increase in their power or even a drop. Also, as mentioned above, member states 
may view the 50-50 system as too efficient, giving the Commission too much power.  
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Figure 6. Power changes: various dual majority schemes vs. status quo 
We turn next to providing intuition for the link between majority thresholds and the 
distribution of power. 
Intuition for why thresholds affect the power distribution 
Figure 5 shows that playing with majority thresholds has important implications for the 
distribution of power. Here we provide intuition for this result. 
As mentioned above, the best way to think of a dual-majority system is view each member’s 
vote as having two weights – one reflecting its population share and one reflecting its 
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membership share. Given the radically skewed distribution of population shares in the EU, the 
weights will be extremely different for different nations. For Germany, its population weight 
will be huge, about 18%, so its member-share weight will be relatively unimportant to 
Germany’s power. The opposite is true for small members such as Estonia. Its population 
share is just three-tenths of 1%, but its membership share is one twenty-seventh or 3.7%, so 
for Estonia, the member-share weight is the most important determinant of its power. Plainly 
then, changing the majority thresholds on population and membership will have different 
effects on large and small members. Specifically, raising the population majority rule raises 
the relative power of very big nations, while raising the membership threshold boosts the 
power of very small nations. 
Take an extreme example. If the population majority threshold was 83% and the membership 
threshold was 50%, Germany alone would be able to break any coalition, or, to put it 
differently, Germany would have a veto on everything. This veto-power comes uniquely from 
its population share; it would be true even if its membership share were zero. Now, think 
about the impact of lowering the population threshold from this extreme level to, say, 70% 
without changing the membership threshold. Such a change would clearly reduce Germany’s 
power share a great deal, but it would have very little impact on Luxembourg’s. After all, 
Luxembourg’s population share (nine-hundredths of 1% in the EU27) would almost never 
matter. (Nevertheless, power shares must add to 100% so a gain to Germany must imply a 
loss to others.) 
Next, do the same thought experiment but start at the other extreme. Suppose the population 
threshold were 50% but the membership threshold were 97%. With such a threshold, any 
member could break any winning coalition, so they would all be equally powerful. Lowering 
the 97% to, say, 70% would reduce the significance of every nation’s membership-share 
weight. Yet exactly because the membership-share weights are much more important to small 
nations, lowering the membership threshold lowers small members’ power relative to that of 
large nations.  
Another recurring feature in the diagrams is the different impact on small and medium-sized 
nations (those with around 10 million citizens). In particular, the power changes for these 
nations, whether positive or negative, tend to be milder than they are for very large or very 
small nations. This result makes perfect sense in the light of the preceding analysis. Changing 
the thresholds tends to shift the relative importance of the two weights on a nation’s vote (the 
tighter the threshold, the more important is the corresponding weight in terms of power 
determination). Because the two weighting schemes tend to be similar for medium-sized 
nations, changing the thresholds has less impact. For example, a nation with 10 million 
citizens has a population share of about 2.2% in the EU27 and a membership share of 3.7%. 
The weights would be identical for a nation with one twenty-seventh of the EU27 population, 
i.e. 17.8 million. 
Fixing the Nice voting reforms 
Dual-majority systems have the great merit of simplicity and ‘communicability’; the sort of 
thing schoolchildren could understand. That being said, any reform must be agreed by all EU 
members, including Spain and Poland who are set to gain ‘near-great power’ status from the 
Nice Treaty. This point leads us to our next question. Can the most noxious aspects of the 
Nice system be fixed? 12 | BALDWIN & WIDGREN 
 
Figure 7.  Power effects of ‘repairing’ the Nice system 
The answer is yes. The damage the Nice rules do to the EU’s capacity to act could be repaired 
without substantially altering its power implications. Only two changes are needed:
8  
1.  Lower the 74% threshold to two-thirds; and 
2.  Lower the population threshold to one-half. 
If the EU lowered the Council-vote threshold to two-thirds and changed nothing else, the 
efficiency of the EU27 Council would rise to roughly the level it was in the EU12, or to be 
precise, 14.1%. Moreover, the population and member safety nets would ensure that gangs of 
small nations representing a narrow slice of EU citizens could not force their will on the big 
nations that represent most EU citizens. Likewise, the membership criteria would prevent a 
minority coalition of big nations from forcing their will on the rest of the EU. 
The downside of such a reform, however, is that it tends to further reduce the power of small 
nations since it would mean that the Council-vote criterion would no longer dominate so 
thoroughly. Although this further loss of power for small nations would be hard to swallow, at 
least their power sacrifice would buy EU efficiency. The second change would help redress 
the additional small-country power loss. 
If in addition to lowering the threshold to two-thirds of Council votes, the threshold on 
population were lowered to 50%, the result of this would be a respectably high passage 
probability (14.6%, which is about twice that of the EU15 under pre-Nice rules). Moreover, as 
Figure 7 shows, the power shift for this would be much smaller. None of the countries would 
gain or lose more than a tenth of a percentage point of power compared with the Nice rules, 
including Spain. As usual, one should not confuse precision and accuracy, but as a rough 
                                                 
8 These were first proposed in Baldwin, R., E. Berglof, F. Giavazzi and M. Widgren (2001), op. cit. 
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guide, the power measures indicate that the ‘repaired’ system would maintain or even increase 
the enlarged Union’s ability to act without further shifting power away from small nations. 
Other voting reforms  
The IGC 2000 considered other Council voting reforms based on re-weighting and unusual 
double-majority systems.
9 These were fully discussed by EU15 members during the 
conference and we evaluated these in terms of efficiency and power in our pre-Nice paper.
10 
None of them maintains EU decision-making capacity so we do not consider them further. 
Concluding remarks 
Despite the centrality of voting reforms in the draft Constitutional Treaty, voting reforms 
were not discussed openly and thoroughly at the European Convention. Little wonder then 
that these reforms are drawing so much conflict at the on-going IGC. 
In this policy brief, we suggest that two variants of Giscard’s 60-50 dual-majority system may 
solve the IGC’s voting reform dilemma – ensuring the EU’s ability to make decisions while 
not excessively changing the power distribution. These are a 60-60 dual-majority, or better 
yet, a 50-50 rule.  
Alternatively, if the on-going IGC finds it impossible to abandon the Nice Treaty’s triple-
majority system and its particular voting weights, we suggest ‘emergency repairs’ that would 
correct the most pernicious aspects of the Nice voting rules. The specific reforms would be to 
lower the Nice Treaty’s threshold on votes to two-thirds and its threshold on population to 
50%. These changes would be enough to maintain the EU’s ability to act. 
                                                 
9 See, for example, the IGC Working Document, CONFER 4796/00 (9/11/00) and the Portuguese Presidency’s 
June 2000 Report on the IGC progress (CONFER 4750/00 and especially the annexes).  
10 Baldwin, R., E. Berglof, F. Giavazzi and M. Widgren (2000), Reforms for tomorrow’s Europe, CEPR 
Discussion Paper 2623, London (retrievable from www.cepr.org). 14 | BALDWIN & WIDGREN 
 
Postscript: The Turkey Question & Its Implications for QMV Reforms 
7 December 2003
∗ 
If press reports are to be believed, reforming the EU’s qualified majority voting is one of the 
last potential ‘deal breakers’ left on the table at the EU’s ongoing IGC. Our recent research 
(the present paper and the background study cited in footnote 1) has sought to inform the 
debate by providing some objective measures of the various voting systems’ likely 
performance, their power and efficiency implications in particular.  
In our November 2003 essay, we looked only at the EU27, but the question of Turkey’s 
eventual membership has, it seems, become an important issue. This short update to our 
November 2003 essay shows the numbers for the EU27 plus Turkey. Readers who are not 
familiar with the tools of voting theory may want to read our earlier work first. 
Efficiency implications 
Turkey’s membership would have only moderate implications for the passage probabilities as 
Figure 8 shows. This is not surprising since moving from 27 members to 28 does not change 
much and Turkey’s large population means it does little to damage efficiency. (Efficiency, if 
not legitimacy, tends to be higher when a large share of power is in the hands of just a few 
nations.)  
As usual, the Nice rules – which are essentially unworkable even in the EU27 – become even 
less viable in an EU28. The 50-50 rule retains its superior efficiency properties, as does the 
60-60 dual majority. Indeed, the 60-60 rule has a passage probability that is higher with 
Turkey than it is without Turkey.
11 For comparison, the figure also shows historical passage 
probabilities; note that the 60-60 rule’s 11% compares favourably with the current 7.8% in the 
EU15.  
Power implications 
Turkish membership has a bigger impact on the power distribution, as measured by the 
‘Normalised Banzhaf Index’ (NBI). For instance, if the Nice rules stay in place, Turkey’s 
membership would generally lower the power of all big and moderately big members (see 
Figure 9). As often happens in power calculations, the results can appear anomalous. For 
example, Denmark is shown to gain a good deal of power. The reason for this has to do with 
the exact numbers. As it turns out, Denmark’s exact combination of population weight and 
membership weight makes it critical in many more coalitions in an EU28 than in an EU27. 
This sort of result shows the importance of avoiding rules that are designed with very specific 
coalitions in mind. For example, a coalition that would be able to block with 39% of the EU 
population in the EU27, might lose that power in a EU28.  
The full set of numbers is given in Table 1 and Table 2 below. 
 
                                                 
∗ We thank Ben Crum for comments and suggestions. 
11 The passage probability rises when the number of winning coalitions increases more than the total number of 
coalitions; Turkey’s big population increases the ways of meeting the 60% population threshold. THE DRAFT CONSTITUTIONAL TREATY’S VOTING REFORM DILEMMA | 15 
 
Passage Probabilities, EU27 and Turkey
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Notes: For the dual majorities, like 62-50, the first number refers to the share of the EU population and the 
second to the share of EU membership. Under the Nice rules, 29 votes were assigned to Turkey and 
the QM-rule on votes is 277/374.  
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
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Notes: This shows the change in power as measured by the Normalised Banzhaf Index (NBI) when Turkey 
joins the EU27; this assumes Nice rules (see previous figure for details). See table in appendix for exact 
figures. 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
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Table 1. NBI’s for EU 27 and 28 under Nice rules 
 Nice 
(28) 
Nice 
(27) 
Change, 
Nice 
rules 28 
vs 27 
Germany 7.3%  7.8%  -0.5%
Turkey 7.3%     
UK 7.3%  7.8%  -0.5%
France 7.3%  7.8%  -0.5%
Italy 7.3%  7.8%  -0.5%
Spain 6.9%  7.4%  -0.5%
Poland 6.9%  7.4%  -0.5%
Romania 1.2%  4.3%  -3.1%
Netherlands 3.7%  4.0%  -0.3%
Greece 3.4%  3.7%  -0.3%
Czech 
Republic 
3.9% 3.7%  0.3%
Belgium   3.4%  3.7%  -0.3%
Hungary 3.4%  3.7%  -0.3%
Portugal 3.4%  3.7%  -0.3%
Sweden 2.9%  3.1%  -0.2%
Bulgaria 0.9%  3.1%  -2.2%
Austria 2.9%  3.1%  -0.2%
Slovakia 2.0%  2.2%  -0.2%
Denmark 3.4%  2.2%  1.2%
Finland 2.0%  2.2%  -0.2%
Ireland 2.0%  2.2%  -0.2%
Lithuania 2.9%  2.2%  0.7%
Latvia 2.0%  1.3%  0.8%
Slovenia 2.0%  1.3%  0.8%
Estonia 1.2%  1.3%  -0.1%
Cyprus 1.2%  1.3%  -0.1%
Luxemburg 1.2%  1.3%  -0.1%
Malta 1.2%  0.9%  0.2%
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Table 2. NBI’s for EU 27 and 28, various QMV reforms 
  50-50 50-60 50-70 60-50 60-60 60-70 70-50 70-60 70-70 62-50 66.6-50 Nice 
Germany 7.3% 10.1%  11.9%  5.0% 6.9% 9.1% 3.8% 4.4% 5.7% 11.5%  10.5%  7.3%
Turkey  7.1% 9.8% 11.7%  4.9% 6.8% 8.9% 3.8% 4.4% 5.6% 11.2%  10.3%  7.3%
UK  5.8% 7.4% 9.0% 4.4% 5.5% 7.0% 3.7% 4.0% 4.8% 8.5%  7.8%  7.3%
France  5.8% 7.4% 9.0% 4.4% 5.5% 7.0% 3.7% 4.0% 4.8% 8.5%  7.7%  7.3%
Italy  5.7% 7.3% 8.8% 4.4% 5.4% 6.9% 3.7% 4.0% 4.7% 8.3%  7.6%  7.3%
Spain  4.6% 5.5% 6.3% 4.0% 4.5% 5.2% 3.6% 3.7% 4.0% 5.9%  5.7%  6.9%
Poland  4.6% 5.4% 6.1% 3.9% 4.4% 5.1% 3.6% 3.7% 4.0% 5.8%  5.6%  6.9%
Romania  3.6% 3.7% 4.0% 3.6% 3.6% 3.8% 3.6% 3.6% 3.6% 3.9%  3.8%  1.2%
NL  3.3% 3.1% 3.0% 3.5% 3.3% 3.2% 3.6% 3.5% 3.4% 3.0%  3.1%  3.7%
Greece  3.0% 2.6% 2.3% 3.4% 3.1% 2.7% 3.5% 3.4% 3.3% 2.4%  2.5%  3.4%
Czech  Rep  3.0% 2.6% 2.3% 3.4% 3.1% 2.7% 3.5% 3.4% 3.3% 2.4%  2.5%  3.9%
Belgium   3.0% 2.6% 2.3% 3.3% 3.1% 2.7% 3.5% 3.4% 3.3% 2.3%  2.5%  3.4%
Hungary 3.0%  2.6%  2.2%  3.3% 3.1% 2.7%  3.5%  3.4% 3.3% 2.3%  2.5%  3.4%
Portugal  3.0% 2.5% 2.2% 3.3% 3.0% 2.7% 3.5% 3.4% 3.3% 2.3%  2.5%  3.4%
Sweden  2.9% 2.4% 2.1% 3.3% 3.0% 2.6% 3.5% 3.4% 3.2% 2.2%  2.3%  2.9%
Bulgaria  2.9% 2.4% 2.0% 3.3% 3.0% 2.5% 3.5% 3.4% 3.2% 2.1%  2.3%  0.9%
Austria  2.9% 2.4% 2.0% 3.3% 3.0% 2.5% 3.5% 3.4% 3.2% 2.1%  2.3%  2.9%
Slovakia  2.7% 2.1% 1.5% 3.3% 2.8% 2.3% 3.5% 3.4% 3.1% 1.7%  2.0%  2.0%
Denmark 2.7% 2.1% 1.5% 3.3% 2.8% 2.3%  3.5%  3.4% 3.1% 1.7%  2.0%  3.4%
Finland 2.7%  2.1%  1.5%  3.2% 2.8% 2.3%  3.5%  3.4% 3.1% 1.7%  1.9%  2.0%
Ireland  2.6% 1.9% 1.3% 3.2% 2.7% 2.1% 3.5% 3.4% 3.1% 1.5%  1.8%  2.0%
Lithuania 2.6% 1.9% 1.3% 3.2% 2.7% 2.1% 3.5% 3.4% 3.1% 1.5%  1.8%  2.9%
Latvia  2.6% 1.8% 1.1% 3.2% 2.7% 2.0% 3.5% 3.4% 3.0% 1.3%  1.7%  2.0%
Slovenia  2.6% 1.8% 1.1% 3.2% 2.7% 2.0% 3.5% 3.4% 3.0% 1.3%  1.6%  2.0%
Estonia  2.5% 1.7% 1.0% 3.2% 2.6% 1.9% 3.5% 3.4% 3.0% 1.2%  1.6%  1.2%
Cyprus 2.5%  1.6%  0.9%  3.2% 2.6% 1.9%  3.5%  3.4% 3.0% 1.1%  1.5%  1.2%
Lux.  2.5% 1.6% 0.8% 3.2% 2.6% 1.8%  3.5%  3.3% 3.0% 1.1%  1.4%  1.2%
Malta  2.5% 1.6% 0.8% 3.2% 2.6% 1.8% 3.5% 3.3% 3.0% 1.1%  1.4%  1.2%
Passage 
 Prob. 
31.9% 19.8% 8.3%  15.1% 11.0% 5.6%  1.7% 1.6% 1.1% 17.3%  11.7%  1.8%
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